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A commentary on
A unified selection signal for attention
and reward in primary visual cortex
by Sta˘nis¸or, L., Van Der Togt, C., Pennartz,
C. M., and Roelfsema, P. R. (2013). Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 9136–9141. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1300117110
Recently, Sta˘nis¸or et al. (2013) showed
in monkeys that the reward value of a
visual stimulus is a good predictor of
primary visual cortex (area V1) activ-
ity. Furthermore V1 neurons with the
strongest reward value effect were also
the ones showing the strongest atten-
tion effect. Taken together, the authors
concluded on overlapping reward value
and top-down attention, and suggested
that theories about reward and top-down
attention coding on vision might be uni-
fied. Alternatively, we suggest that the
unified signal for attention and reward
is actually an attentional control signal
originating in the prefrontal cortex (PFC).
Technically, it is not clear how the
design by Sta˘nis¸or et al. (2013) allows dis-
entangling between attention and reward.
Our observation is reminiscent with the
critical review by Maunsell (2004) accord-
ing to which neurophysiological stud-
ies aiming at dissociating attention and
reward have failed to distinguish between
the allocation of attention and the rep-
resentation of the subject’s assessment of
what is to be rewarding. In this case, it is
likely that neuronal signals related to the
two cognitive processes may be found to
be unified. Theoretically, it is not excluded
that the two processes involved in Sta˘nis¸or
et al.’ study (2013) may belong to a sin-
gle cognitive function, namely attentional
control. Attentional control is the ability
to maintain goal-directedness by sustain-
ing information-processing in the face of
distraction. Associated with the activity of
the PFC, it controls all subsidiary processes
subserved by other cortical and subcorti-
cal regions. Primary sensory cortices, such
as area V1, are also modulated by the PFC
(Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Since seminal studies in humans by
Harlow (1848/1999) and Luria (1966)
on affective and cognitive processes of
PFC, motivation and attention have tra-
ditionally been considered as distinct
aspects of control. In line with Spinoza,
Damasio (1994) unified the two pro-
cesses showing that affect and its asso-
ciated somatic markers are critical to
make proper selection and decision. More
recently, attentional control models have
provided comprehensive descriptions of
motivational and cognitive processes of
control. As example, Stuss et al.’s model
(Stuss et al., 1995) describes several atten-
tional tasks (setting, sustaining, suppress-
ing, switching, concentrating, preparing
and sharing) recruiting multiple cog-
nitive processes (energizing, inhibiting,
adjusting, monitoring, controlling and
task setting). Each of these processes is
expected to fit a particular neural net-
work, which to date has been identified
for at least three of them. Energizing
schemata or energization, the process of
initiating and sustaining any response, is
related to dorsomedial PFC, while moni-
toring the level of activity in schemata is
related to right dorsolateral PFC (Stuss,
2011). Energization, involved in all atten-
tional tasks except suppressing, may be
viewed as motivational aspects of atten-
tion. Such modulation by the dorsomedial
and dorsolateral PFC for respectively
energization and monitoring act in paral-
lel onto all brain areas, including sensory
cortices.
In the meanwhile, theories of decision
signal have described a random walk pro-
cess determined by the distance between
initial and final thresholds, which can
be modulated by prediction or urgency,
and the accumulation of sensory evidence
or gain, which varies with the supply
of information provided to the system
(Carpenter, 1981; Hanes and Schall, 1996;
Kim and Shadlen, 1999). Bridging atten-
tion and decision models, we additionally
suggest that energization is not different
from adjusting the distance to the deci-
sion signal thresholds, whereas monitor-
ing may fit the accumulation of evidence.
Consistent with this idea, Domenech and
Dreher (2010) demonstrated double dis-
sociation in humans in which the ante-
rior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral PFC
code, respectively, the distance to the
threshold and the accumulation of sen-
sory evidence. In this context, we sug-
gest that monitoring and energizing may
be the two signals recorded by Sta˘nis¸or
et al. (2013) for respectively attention
and reward, consistent with their reported
behavioral accuracy, eye speed, reaction
time variability, and patterns of V1 neu-
ral activity. Thus two apparently distinct
signals recorded in V1 that are depen-
dent of the relative and of the atten-
tion value of the stimulus may be in fact
the result of two attentional control pro-
cesses. In other words, the reported uni-
fied signal for attention and reward can
also be viewed as a double signal of a
signal function—attentional control—in
which energization and monitoring act as
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two modulatory systems of the attention
network.
How could future studies be improved
to separately examine attention and
reward and their related neuronal activ-
ities? Our suggestion is twofold. About
the task, one possibility to assess atten-
tion without reward might be to observe
the subject’ spontaneous movement to
stimuli varying in different aspects (space,
time, features, etc.). For reward, we would
suggest to observe the subject’s self-
reward (using non-addictive substance)
in relationship to spontaneous preferred
movement to stimuli equal in all aspects
thus not requiring attention. In summary,
what may be observed is not subject’s
conditioning to human experimenter’s
expectations in terms of the importance
given to one aspect of the stimulus (for
attention) and of performance merit and
credit (for reward), but rather the subject’s
spontaneous behavior and expectations at
either attentional or motivational levels.
About the measurement, one possibility to
distinguish between attention and reward
might be to use our knowledge of technical
tools and of neural bases of Bayesian deci-
sion models. Indeed, it is likely that some
modulation of the distance to thresh-
olds versus of the gain might reveal
some action onto motivational versus
monitoring dimensions of attention,
respectively.
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